[This is a footnoted version of an article that appeared in _Z_, June 1993.]





On March 27, the Clinton administration announced its military budget for fiscal year (FY) 1994: $263 billion -- more than a quarter of a trillion dollars.<1> The Soviet Union, which just recently -- according to Defense Department propagandists -- was outspending the Pentagon and poised to take over Western Europe, is no more. Yet, Clinton is requesting a larger military budget for this "new era" (after correcting for inflation) than did Eisenhower, Ford, Nixon, and Carter in every peace-time year of their presidencies. Clinton's budget is comparable to the average for the five peace-time years of Kennedy and Johnson. Only by the bloated standards of Reagan and Bush has there been any decline.<2> And even then, Clinton's budget request is only 4 percent lower than Bush had wanted.<3>



To understand why the end of the Cold War and the end of Republican rule have not led to any decisive reductions in U.S. military spending, it is useful to look at the story of one particular weapons system, the V-22 Osprey. The Osprey is -- or will be, since it isn't operational yet -- a hybrid airplane and helicopter. It will combine an airplane's range and speed with a helicopter's capability for hovering and vertical take-off and landing. It will look like a plane with big propellers; when in helicopter mode, the rotors will tilt upward.

This tiltrotor technology is still unproven, but it is potentially far more effective than that used by existing primitive vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. The Soviet Navy, for example, featured the vertical takeoff Yak-36 Forger which could be deployed from the deck of a ship. Pentagon threat assessors used to ominously warn that these ships were comparable to the huge U.S. aircraft carriers with their modern jet fighters, but the Forgers used so much fuel on take-off and landing that they couldn't spend more than 16 minutes in the air.<4> The Osprey, however, is to be a different bird. It will have the capability of flying more than 1,000 miles with a 10,000 pound payload or self-deploying over 2,000 miles -- and with in- flight refueling even further. It will be able to travel at 250 miles per hour, loaded with 24 fully-equipped combat-troops.

Military analysts agree that the V-22 would not have been a particularly useful aircraft in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflagration in Central Europe. But the Osprey could be tremendously valuable for power projection, for a contested landing of U.S. troops in a Third World country. To the Marine Corps, it is precisely these sorts of missions that have always been foremost. As Marine Commandant General A. M. Gray told a Congressional committee in 1990, the "Marines have responded to 109 crises since 1945 with only a handful in response to Soviet actions."<5> In the 1980s, foreign military bases and prepositioned supplies meant that the Marines were able to -- in General Gray's words -- "strike like Genghis Khan,"<6> and Gray anticipated no lessening in the need for Genghis Khan-like behavior: "Even as the threat of Communism and the Soviet military machine seem to be diminishing, regional threats to U.S. interests are growing in military, economic and political power." But, Gray warned, while the threats are growing, "at the same time we find our military presence less welcome and so it becomes more difficult to project military power from forward bases." The answer to this challenge, he declared, was a maritime force with "the ability to be where the trouble is brewing without the need of forward basing."<7> Thus, the V-22 was an essential component of the Marines' interventionist posture, and indeed the Osprey was considered "the most important item needed for projection forces," to quote a former Marine General who became military correspondent for the _New York Times_.<8>

In 1982, Pentagon planners had first proposed the development of an advanced vertical lift aircraft that would serve the Army, the Marines, the Navy, and the Air Force. In 1985, the Marine mission was made primary, and the Army reduced to a minor role.<9> The next year, a $1.7 billion contract was awarded to the team of Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Helicopter to design and produce three ground test models of the Osprey and six aircraft for flight-testing.<10> In 1988, the Army fully pulled out of the program, citing excessive cost, and so at that point the plan was to produce 552 V-22s for the Marines, 50 for the Navy, and 55 for the Air Force, in addition to the six prototypes.<11>



When George Bush became president, he faced strong budget pressures caused by his predecessor's raging deficits. On April 14, 1989, Bush agreed with Congressional leaders to cut $9.7 billion from the military budget; this was only a 3 percent decrease, but given Bush's commitment to such high-ticket programs as Star Wars and the B-2 "stealth" bomber, he didn't have much leeway in devising cuts. The Osprey had already encountered technical difficulties and cost overruns in the development stage, and there were sharp increases too in estimates of what it would cost to actually produce the planes. And so when Defense Secretary Dick Cheney submitted his new budget for FY 1990 on April 25, it called for canceling the V-22 program and for funding instead a new helicopter as a cheaper alternative. Although the initial price-tag for the Osprey was not great, Cheney argued, the project was projected to cost some $25 billion over the decade, an unaffordable investment given the declining military budget.

The Marines were infuriated at Cheney's decision, but the Bush administration faced strong opposition as well from the Democratic-controlled Congress. Even before the Defense Secretary presented his budget, the Senate adopted a non-binding resolution sponsored by a bi-partisan group of lawmakers headed by Democrat John Glenn of Ohio (a retired marine colonel) and Republican Ted Stevens of Alaska urging the president to fully fund the V-22.<12> Congressional fans of the Osprey soon had more telling ways to express their support for the plane: the military budget had to be considered by Congressional committees and then approved on the floor of the House and Senate.

In the House Armed Services Committee, Republicans reflexively backed Cheney, as did Committee chair Les Aspin, who declared that "While the budget may not be perfect, it's a darn good product." In his first year in office, Aspin said, Cheney "deserves a vote of confidence."<13> But a narrow majority of the Committee, including more than two-thirds of the Democrats, among them Pat Schroeder of Colorado, restored funding for the V- 22 and for two other projects cut by Cheney: the F-14D Navy fighter and extra spending on the reserves.<14> On the floor of the House, the restoration of funds for the V-22 and the F-14D was energetically pushed by the Democratic leadership. An amendment to eliminate these projects was soundly defeated, 278- 143, with only a handful of Democrats joining Aspin in backing Cheney's cuts. Those who voted to defeat the amendment included virtually all the House liberals: Atkins, Boxer, Conyers, Crocket, Dellums, Downey, Dwyer, Dymally, Flake, Frank, Hamilton, Kennedy, Lantos, Levin, Levine, McCloskey, Moakley, Owens, Payne, Rangel, Schroeder, Schumer, Solarz, Studds, Torricelli, Udall, Waxman, Weiss, and Wolpe.<15>



The House recommended not just funding for research and development on the V-22, but for production as well, despite the fact that no Osprey prototype had yet flown in airplane mode. The more cautious Senate approved funding for research and development only. The final conference version of the military budget adopted the Senate position, but authorized that funds appropriated for V-22 production in the previous year's budget (FY 1989) be spent. The Pentagon, however, refused to obligate the FY 1989 money and an annual battle ensued between the Administration and Congress.

In 1990 Cheney submitted his FY 1991 budget request. He again asked for no funds for the V-22, and instead requested money to provide the Marines with a cheaper medium-lift helicopter. Reversing Cheney again, Congress's military appropriations bill authorized $238 million in research and development funds for the V-22 and $165 million in procurement funding, to be added to $200 million in deferred FY 1989 procurement funding. In addition, Congress prohibited any aircraft research and development funds to be used for anything that might replace the Osprey.<16>

In the Senate's Projection Forces and Regional Defense subcommittee, it was the chair, Ted Kennedy, who proposed the amendment adding research and development funding for the V- 22.<17> On the Senate floor, the V-22 amendment was submitted by 12 members -- among them Democrats Alan Dixon (IL), John Glenn (OH), Lloyd Bentsen (TX), Frank Lautenberg (NJ), and Claiborne Pell (RI) -- and accepted by the floor managers of both parties.<18>

One of the factors contributing to Congressional support for the V-22 was a study conducted for the Pentagon by the Institute for Defense Analysis that found the Osprey to be more cost- effective over the long-run than helicopter alternatives, provided one took account of the V-22's greater capability to deliver troops ashore and its greater survivability. Cheney remained unconvinced: the projected cost of the Osprey had already increased from $25 billion over the next decade to $30 billion, and given the inherent difficulties with new technology, the projections were likely to grow. In addition, serious technical snags had been experienced in such areas as vibration, the flight control system, avionics, weight, slow software development, and the non-availability or faulty functioning of hardware.<19>

The next year saw another replay of these events. Cheney again requested no V-22 funds. Despite the crash of one of the V-22 test planes, Congress's enthusiasm persisted: it authorized $790 million in the FY 1992 military budget to proceed with the development, manufacture, and operational test of three "production representative" Ospreys. Again Cheney refused to comply, claiming that it was not possible as a matter of engineering to meet the Congressional requirements; the V-22, he claimed, could not be built to specification in the time allotted with the funds available.<20>

In 1992, for the fourth year in a row, Cheney asked Congress to appropriate no money for the V-22. And, for the fourth year in a row, Congress supported the aircraft. In May, the House Armed Services Committee voted funding for the Osprey and added the provision that for each month that Cheney refused to obligate the money, the staff of his Pentagon comptroller would be reduced 5 percent.<21> The Senate lent its weight to the issue when 40 members sent Bush a pro-Osprey letter; signatories ranged from Jesse Helms on the right to liberals such as Wofford, Cranston, Chafee, Hatfield, Lautenberg, Harkin, and Leahy.<22>

Cheney finally gave in. On July 2 he offered Congress a compromise: he would move forward on the V-22 in FY 1993 if he could also pursue development of a new helicopter, with no definitive decision on which would be chosen to serve the medium- lift needs of the armed forces.<23> Cheney's reversal, the _New York Times_ noted in a page one story, was "both a substantive and symbolic retreat" from "Pentagon budget-trimming plans that have been strenuously resisted by Congress."<24>

Later that month, the second Osprey test-plane crashed, this time killing seven crew members. "Tough as it is, these things happen," declared John P. Murtha, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who was the chair of the Defense Appropriations subcommittee and a V- 22 enthusiast.<25> Congress's final FY 1993 military budget provided $755 million in new funding for the V-22, though it specified that only half the money could be spent until the Marines issued a report on this latest crash.<26>



Some of the most avid -- even fanatical -- Osprey supporters in Congress represented districts in Texas and Pennsylvania where the plane was being built. Additional backing was secured by spreading the Osprey's subcontracts around to almost 2,000 companies in more than 40 states; industry lobbyists descended on Capitol Hill to make sure members knew where the subcontractors were located.<27> But pork barrel alone is an inadequate explanation for Congress's fervor for the V-22. Many members of Congress received no pork. Ted Stevens of Alaska, for example, was a strong Osprey booster even though, as he took pains to point out, not one piece of it would be made in his state.<28> On the other hand, Stevens was one of the largest recipients of campaign contributions from military Political Action Committees. Stevens, of course, would be quick to deny that he was influenced in any way by the PAC money; he would argue that he received the contributions because of the views he held, not the other way around. But while this distinction might be of some interest in assessing Stevens' character, it is of no consequence for understanding the workings of the American political system.<29>

Military industries distribute large amounts of money, particularly to those legislators sitting on key committees. Even this, however, is insufficient to explain the support for the V-22. After all, some members of Congress had a stake in the pork from the helicopter alternative to the tiltrotor aircraft and received campaign contributions from that contractor. For a considerable number of legislators, backing the Osprey reflected their devotion to the Marine Corps. As Guam's non-voting representative put it, "The aircraft is proven. It is needed. The warriors have spoken. What else do we need? What else is there?"<30>

More generally, however, members of Congress were committed not so much to the Marine Corps as to the policy of interventionism in which the Marine Corps specialized. It was this argument that converted Les Aspin, the chair of the House Armed Services Committee, into an Osprey supporter in 1990. As he told a press conference in August of that year:

There's a lot of things that have happened over the last year [that] have improved the case for the V-22 . . . . One is the IDA Study. A second is the collapse of the Warsaw Pact . . . . [W]e are now looking at the question of how do you size and shape the forces of the United States without the Soviet threat? And in that kind of world where you're looking to other threats . . . terrorism, drugs, the kinds of things that you're going to call upon your military to do . . . the V-22 comes in as a better case. I'm someone who voted against the V-22 a year ago and voted for it this year in the committee.<31>

Frank McCloskey, Democrat of Indiana, declared on the floor of the House that

all of us realize that the very possibility for low intensity conflict as we saw in Panama, as we have seen in Grenada, as we saw over in the Middle East will come time and time again. And who will we call upon? We will call upon the Marines, and we will call upon our Special Operations Forces. Their top priority remains the V-22.<32>

Arlen Spector of Pennsylvania noted the special advantages of the Osprey for special operations missions, "such as contingencies in Central America."<33> Ted Kennedy asserted that if we'd had the V-22 in 1980, "it could have made the difference in the Iranian hostage rescue mission."<34> Two weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Sen. Dale Bumpers warned that he foresaw the United States having to defend its oil supplies in the Middle East. "I think it will come within the lifetime of an Osprey."<35> And Sen. McCain of Arizona cautioned that if we cut the Marine's power projection capability, "we may be placing in jeopardy our capabilities to address Liberian, Libyan, Panamanian and other problems that seem to arise all too frequently in this era of unprecedented peace and the end of the cold war."<36>



To many members of Congress, the V-22 was not just militarily valuable, but promised great benefit to the civilian aircraft industry as well. In 1986, Sen. Barry Goldwater identified the tiltrotor as "the most significant aviation development . . . since the Wright brothers."<37> Rep. Robert Torricelli of New Jersey opened hearings on the civilian applications of this technology in 1990 by declaring that the tiltrotor "has the potential to affect in a profound and enduring way the future of air transportation, and indeed, the continuing leadership of the United States in this important international field." There have been, proclaimed Torricelli, "only a handful of such technologies in the history of aviation. Those that understood their importance and had the vision to undertake their development were rewarded with many years of unchallenged market dominance."<38>

Osprey supporters love to repeat the story of the Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry who visited Bell Helicopter-Textron's V-22 manufacturing facility in Fort Worth, Texas. After viewing the Osprey, the minister was said to have remarked: "If you produce this aircraft, I guarantee you we will buy it; if you do not, I guarantee you we will build it." In fact, however, Bell-Boeing propagandists have been forced to acknowledge that these words were probably never spoken.<39> But trying to mobilize Americans by the spector of Japanese or European competition has been a hallmark of those who champion the V-22: the military needs the V-22, and certainly our U.S. industry needs it, because those are the kinds of jobs that we need to have. Steel is gone, shoes are gone, textiles are gone; we are in big trouble in a lot of our commercial areas. This is the kind of export we need to have.<40>

When the tiltrotor is built, Rep. Hochbrueckner of Long Island asked ominously, "will it say Made in America or Made in Japan or Europe?"<41> Bell-Boeing reported Congressional testimony claiming that if the United States developed the tiltrotor, the country would benefit by a $10-15 billion trade surplus by the year 2010; but if it didn't, "America may suffer not only the loss of revenue and jobs, but the fiscal drain and embarrassment of buying our own product abroad."<42>

The United States has a five-year lead worldwide in tiltrotor technology, but this doesn't mean that the technology is -- or will ever be in the foreseeable future -- commercially viable. According to the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, "Tiltrotors will not offer improved cost, airspeed, trip frequency, or comfort over existing aircraft serving urban airports." Noise and environmental problems would be added drawbacks. The one benefit of the tiltrotor would be relieving congestion on runways and on roads leading to airports, but congestion in the air would be increased. Upgrading the country's existing rail system to high-speed trains would likely be a far less expensive alternative for dealing with airport crowding.<43>

U.S. air-carriers have not been interested in the tiltrotor, and private investors have not been willing to commit funds to develop it.<44> But, as Sen. Jim Exon of Nebraska noted, the aviation companies "would love the Federal Government and taxpayers to go to the expense" of developing the new technology for them.<45> Of course, they could just ask the American people to directly subsidize them and their future profits, but this is unlikely to be popular with the public, a majority of whom have experienced a decrease in their real family income over the last 15 years.<46>

Tiltrotor technology operates like a cult belief on Capitol Hill. In 1990, 140 members of Congress were part of the "Tiltrotor Technology Coalition," as were such private citizens as Ross Perot and Donald Trump.<47> On July 27, 1992 -- just a week after the Osprey prototype crashed into the Potomac -- the House of Representatives voted to establish a commission to study the commercial uses of the V-22.<48>

Even Ron Dellums has been attracted to the V-22 by its civilian potential: "it's got this dual capability and at a time when our industrial base is literally disintegrating, we've got to start thinking about what we've got to do to keep American industry alive in this country."<49> But if one wanted to propose an industrial policy for the United States, where government planning and funds would be used to develop products of commercial value, then the public ought to share in the profits and the planning. Yet even if we were to accept the capitalist framework, the costs and benefits of one industrial plan rather than another ought to be debated on their merits, not made a function of the military utility of a product. And for all the talk of the benefits of technological spin-off from military spending, the benefits will surely be far less than if the same money had been targeted directly to civilian purposes.

Other Osprey devotees have promoted the plane as useful for containing oil spills or for emergency health care delivery.<50> But, again, one could do far more for the environment or for health care by spending the $20 or 30 billion that the V-22 will cost directly on those causes.

One member of Congress called the V-22 "a peace dividend"; "the V-22 is conversion."<51> It is not. It is a military aircraft designed for U.S. power projection, specifically for what Sen. Sam Nunn said was one of the key post-Cold War military missions: conducting "forcible entry in small and medium-scale contingencies."<52>



During the 1992 election campaign, George Bush used the power of his office to sell weapons abroad as a way to save jobs and thereby win votes. He approved the sale of 72 F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia, preserving 7,000 jobs in St. Louis; reversed the 10-year-old limit on the sale of advanced weaponry to Taiwan, saving 3,000 jobs in Fort Worth; and personally lobbied the Kuwaiti royal family to buy tanks made in Michigan and Ohio.<53> Then, two weeks before Election Day, the White House announced that Defense Secretary Cheney was releasing funds so that work on the Osprey could continue. Vice President Dan Quayle rushed to Philadelphia to trumpet the good news to Boeing workers.<54>

The presidential campaign of Bill Clinton also featured much opportunism. In Ohio and Michigan he assured crowds that he would continue to build the M1-A1 tank; in Connecticut he declared his support for the Seawolf nuclear submarine (a particularly useless vessel after the Cold War).<55> But his often-proclaimed support for the V-22 was probably not just an election gambit. Given his infatuation with high-tech solutions for the problems of the U.S. economy and his acceptance of the broad outlines of Bush's foreign and military policy (a little more hawkish on Cuba and the Palestinians, a little less enthusiastic on troops in Europe), for Clinton the V-22 seemed like a natural. In the first presidential debate, Clinton pointed to the Osprey as an outstanding example of a military project with commercial applications and a prime illustration of the sort of weapons system appropriate to a post-cold-war strategy "of moving small military forces rapidly" to the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.<56>

In his thinking on military spending and national security, Clinton relied heavily on three Congressional Democrats: Rep. Les Aspin, chair of the House Armed Services Committee; Sen. Sam Nunn, chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Rep. Dave McCurdy of Oklahoma, chair of the House Intelligence Committee.<57> All three, and Vice-President Al Gore, were among the top recipients of money from military PACs. When Clinton took office, he named Aspin as his Defense Secretary. The military budget for FY 1994 that they unveiled in March placed "special emphasis on strategic mobility and military power projection" by funding such projects as a new amphibious assault ship and the V-22 Osprey.<58>

The Osprey has already cost more than twice as much as the original estimate. Some analysts worry that the final price-tag may be several times current projections.<59> In fact, a few cynical Defense Department officials argue that cost-overruns are actually encouraged by the Pentagon and the contractors who hope that it will be harder to cancel a project if huge amounts of money have already been spent on it. It is standard operating procedure, these officials note, to overpromise on performance and underestimate on future costs.<60>

Huge cost and the risks of high-tech gadgetry are indeed good reasons to oppose the Osprey. (In January, the chief test- pilot for the V-22 quit, charging that Boeing was cutting corners and that the plane was unfit to fly.<61>) But these are not the only issues. It will be an incredible waste of money if the V-22 doesn't work. But it will be even worse if it turns out that Sen. John Glenn is right and the V-22 becomes "one of the greatest advances we have for conventional warfare enhancement."<62> Anything that helps the Marines "strike like Genghis Khan" will not help the cause of peace and justice.


/------------------------------------------\ | Top 10 Senate Recipients of | | Military PAC Money, 1989-90 | | (thousands of dollars) | | Candidate Party State Amount | | --------- ----- ----- ------ | | Dan Coats R IN $190.0 | | J. Bennett Johnston D LA 176.7 | | Ted Stevens R AK 162.4 | | John W. Warner R VA 161.3 | | J. James Exon D NE 159.9 | | Carl Levin D MI 117.5 | | Strom Thurmond R SC 107.1 | | Albert Gore Jr. D TN 104.6 | | Sam Nunn D GA 103.1 | | Phil Gramm R TX 100.3 | | | | Top 10 House Recipients of | | Military PAC Money, 1989-90 | | (thousands of dollars) | | Candidate Party State Amount | | --------- ----- ----- ------ | | John P. Murtha D PA $180.9 | | Charles Wilson D TX 152.0 | | William L. Dickinson R AL 115.4 | | Les Aspin D WI 104.0 | | W.G. (Bill) Hefner D NC 98.6 | | Joseph M. McDade R PA 96.3 | | Herbert H. Bateman R VA 84.2 | | Robert W. Davis R MI 69.4 | | C.W. Bill Young R FL 69.3 | | Dave McCurdy D OK 65.0. | | | | member of a military-related committee | | or subcommittee. All candidates were | | incumbents; all won re-election. | | | | Source: Center for Responsive Politics, | | printed in Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Weapons | | Makers Intensify Lobbying Efforts As | | Budgets Fall," _NYT_, Aug. 6, 1991, p. A1. | \------------------------------------------/



1. This includes $250.7 billion for the Department of Defense and $12.6 billion in other military spending. "National Defense Budget" in FY 1994 Defense Budget Briefing Charts, Dept. of Defense, 27 March 1993.

2. 1951-90 data from William W. Kaufmann and Lawrence J. Korb, _The 1990 Defense Budget_, Washington, DC: Brookings, 1989, p. 10; FY 1994 from "National Defense Budget," in FY 1994 Defense Budget Briefing Charts, Dept. of Defense, 27 March 1993; 1994 price deflator from Gene Ebner, Office of Budget and Management. These data reflect budget authority, not outlays.

3. "FY 1994 Defense Budget Cuts," in FY 1994 Defense Budget Briefing Charts, Dept. of Defense, 27 March 1993. Bush's Jan. 1993 request for "national defense," adjusted for inflation was $275.5 billion; Clinton cut $11.4 billion, or 4.1%.

4. Andrew Cockburn, _The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine_, New York: Vintage, 1984, pp. 407-08.

5. Senate Armed Services Committee, _Dept. of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1991_, Hearings, May-June, 1990, p. 252. Hereafter cited as SASC, _DoD Auth FY 1991_.

6. SASC, _DoD Auth FY 1991_, p. 234.

7. SASC, _DoD Auth FY 1991_, p. 252. This does not mean that the era of Washington's foreign military bases has come to an end. Even after scheduled closures, noted a report by the staff of the congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus in June 1992, the number of major U.S. bases overseas "will still be more than 85 percent of the level of a decade ago -- at the height of the Cold War." In 1992, the Pentagon had troops or agreements to deploy troops in some 50 countries and was negotiating arrangements with 38 additional countries. While decreasing its presence in Europe, the United States has been rapidly expanding its presence in the Middle East. See Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, _Global Outreach: The U.S. Military Presence Overseas_, June 1992, pp. 1-2.

8. Bernard E. Trainor, "Force Projection," in _American Defense Annual, 1990-1991_, ed. Joseph Kruzel, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990, p. 148.

9. Joint Services Operational Requirement for the Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft, Dept. of Defense, 14 Dec. 1982, and revision, April 1985.

10. General Accounting Office, statement of Martin M. Ferber before House Armed Services subcommittees on R&D and Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, "Naval Aviation: Status of V-22 Osprey Full-Scale Development," GAO/T-NSIAD-91-19, 11 Ap. 1991, p. 2.

11. House Armed Services Committee, Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems subcommittee, _Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and Other Procurement_, Hearings, March-April 1991 (HASC No. 102-7), p. 151, reprinting Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft (Weapons Facts)," _CRS Issue Brief_, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, IB86103, 25 Feb. 1991, p. 2. Hearings cited as HASC, _Procurement_.

12. _Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1989_, Washington, DC, p. 427 (hereafter cited as _CQ Almanac_ plus year); _Congressional Record_, 19 April 1989, pp. S4508-09 (hereafter cited as _Cong. Rec._

13. _CQ Almanac 1989_, p. 430.

14. _CQ Almanac 1989_, pp. 431-34.

15. _CQ Almanac 1989_, pp. 56H-57H.

16. Dick Cheney to Thomas S. Foley, 2 July 1992; Cooper, _CRS Issue Brief_, pp. 5-6.

17. _Cong. Rec._, 3 Aug. 1990, p. S12086.

18. _Cong. Rec._, 3 Aug. 1990, p. S12085.

19. GAO, "Naval Aviation: Status of V-22 Osprey Full-Scale Development," p. 2.

20. Cheney to Foley, 2 July 1992; O'Keefe in House Armed Services Committee, subcommittees on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems and Research and Development, "Status of the V-22 Osprey Airplane," Hearing, print out, 5 August 1992, p. 21. Cited as HASC, "Status of V-22."

21. Pat Towell, "Aspin Wants $274 Billion, $3 Billion Below Cap," _Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report_, 30 May 1992, p. 1544. Hereafter _CQWR_.

22. _Cong. Rec._ 4 June 1992, p. S7577.

23. Cheney to Foley, 2 July 1992; Pat Towell, "Big Ticket Projects Remain Intact As House Passes Spending Bill," _CQWR_, 4 July 1992, p. 1975.

24. Michael Gordon, "Feeling Pressure, Cheney Agrees To Allow Work On Novel Aircraft," _New York Times_ (hereafter _NYT_), 3 July 1992, p. A1.

25. _CQWR_, 1 Aug. 1992, p. 2182.

26. Pat Towell, "Bill Shaves Personnel Spending But Slices Weapons Purchases," _CQWR_, 17 Oct. 1992, p. 3189.

27. Louis Uchitelle, "An Odd Aircraft's Tenacity Shows Difficulty of Cutting Arms Budget," _NYT_, Nov. 2, 1992, p. A1.

28. _Cong. Rec._, 19 April 1989, p. S4507.

29. If politicians with the "right" views get the funds they need to secure and retain office while those with the "wrong" views do not, then officeholders will tend to have the right views. The politicians may not be for sale, but the offices are.

30. HASC, _Procurement_, p. 187.

31. Bell Boeing, "National Priorities and the V-22," _V-22 Issue Papers_, RNP-1(07-10-91/R-11-24-92), p. 2.

32. McCloskey, _Cong. Rec._, 12 July 1990, p. H4641.

33. Specter, _Cong. Rec._, 21 June 1990, p. S8426.

34. Bell Boeing, "Osprey Quotes," _V-22 Issue Papers_, OQ-1(07- 19-90), p. 1.

35. Bell Boeing, "The V-22 and The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict," _V-22 Issue Papers_, IK-1(08-17-90), p. 2.

36. SASC, _DoD Auth FY 1991_, p. 249.

37. Bell Boeing, "Osprey Quotes," _V-22 Issue Papers_, OQ-1(07- 19-90), p. 1.

38. House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation and Materials, _Civil Tiltrotor Applications Research_, Hearings, 17 July 1990, p. 1.

39. Bell Boeing, "V-22 Technology Transfer," _V-22 Issue Papers_, TT-1(07-03-90), p. 1.

40. HASC, _Procurement_, p. 206.

41. _Cong. Rec._, 12 July 1990, p. H4650.

42. Bell Boeing, "America First: The Tiltrotor," _V-22 Issue Papers_, U-1(06-15-90)R-6-92, p. 2, citing April, 1990 testimony to the House Aviation Subcommittee.

43. US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, _New Ways: Tiltrotor Aircraft & Magnetically Levitated Vehicles_, OTA-SET- 507, Washington, DC: USGPO, Oct. 1991, pp. 8, 44; Louis Uchitelle, "An Odd Aircraft's Tenacity Shows Difficulty of Cutting Arms Budget," _NYT_, Nov. 2, 1992, p. A1.

44. OTA, _New Ways_, pp. 7-8.

45. Clifford Krauss, "New Doubts Voiced Over Disputed Plane," _NYT_, 22 July 1992, p. A12.

46. Citizens for Tax Justice, _Inequality and the Federal Budget Deficit_, Washington, DC: Sept. 1991, p. 6.

47. McCloskey, _Cong. Rec._, 12 July 1990, p. H4640; Elizabeth Donovan and David Steigman, "Gray: V-22 Substitute Scheme 'Ridiculous,'" _Navy Times_, 5 March 1990, in _Cong. Rec._, 21 June 1990, p. S8431.

48. _CQWR_, 1 Aug. 1992, p. 2271.

49. HASC, "Status of V-22," p. 67.

50. Geren, _Cong. Rec._, 3 Aug. 1990, p. E2716; _Cong. Rec._, 12 Sept. 1991, p. E3028.

51. Hochbrueckner, _Cong. Rec._, 12 July 1990, p. H4649.

52. Quoted in Bell Boeing, "Senator Nunn's Vision of Defense Strategy and the V-22," _V-22 Issue Papers_, N-1(07-03-90), p. 1.

53. Eric Schmitt, "Timing of Big Pact Aids Bush in Pennsylvania," _NYT_, 23 Oct. 1992, p. A14.

54. Louis Uchitelle, "An Odd Aircraft's Tenacity Shows Difficulty of Cutting Arms Budget," _NYT_, 2 Nov. 1992, p. A1.

55. David E. Rosenbaum, "The 1992 Campaign; Bush and Bounty," _NYT_, 24 Sept. 1992, p. A22. On the Seawolf, see also, Clifford Krauss, "Keeping the Seawolf Afloat; In Battle of Budget, Democrats Defend Military Hardware," _NYT_, 17 May 1992, p. IV:5.

56. Louis Uchitelle, "An Odd Aircraft's Tenacity Shows Difficulty of Cutting Arms Budget," _NYT_, 2 Nov. 1992, p. A1.

57. Eric Schmitt, "The 1992 Campaign; Clinton and Bush Agree On Trimming Armed Forces, But Their Paths Vary," _NYT_, Oct. 21, 1992, p. A20.

58. "FY 1994 Defense Budget Begins New Era," News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), no. 126-93, 27 March 1993, p. 2.

59. Louis Uchitelle, "An Odd Aircraft's Tenacity Shows Difficulty of Cutting Arms Budget," _NYT_, 2 Nov. 1992, p. A1.

60. Louis Uchitelle, "An Odd Aircraft's Tenacity Shows Difficulty of Cutting Arms Budget," _NYT_, 2 Nov. 1992, p. A1.

61. "'The Osprey Can't Do It,'" _Newsweek_, 8 March 1993, p. 6.

62. _Cong. Rec._, 21 March 1991, p. S3840.